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SETTLING LARGE CASE LITIGATION:
AN ALTERNATE APPROACHt
By Eric D. Green, * Jonathan B. Marks**
& Ronald L. Olson***
I. INTRODUCTION
Over 50 years ago, Judge Learned Hand told the Bar of New York,
"As a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short
of sickness and death."I Judge Hand's remark is even more true today.
The burgeoning costs and demoralizing delays of dispute resolution
through formal, legal means are central to the crisis which so many now
perceive in the American system of civil justice.
2
For the individual litigant, efforts are being made to confront and
resolve the crisis. By far the largest single cost of litigation is attorney's
fees. In this area, the OEO Legal Services Program and the Legal
Services Corporation have made significant strides towards providing
free counsel to the poorest Americans. Group and prepaid legal service
programs have been started to provide legal services to middle-income
Americans at affordable prices. In addition, there is growing recognition
that less formal mechanisms of dispute resolution may provide the best
answer to the problems of expense and delay which beset individual civil
litigants in our courts.3 For example, mandatory arbitration of smaller
t Copyright 1978 by Eric D. Green, Jonathan B. Marks and Ronald L. Olson.
* B.A., 1968 (Brown); J.D., 1972 (Harvard); Associate Professor of Law, Boston
University.
** B.A., 1966 (Harvard); J.D., 1972 (Harvard). Member, State Bars of California,
District of Columbia and Florida.
*** B.A., 1963 (Drake); J.D., 1966 (Michigan). Chrm., Comm. on Litigation Manage-
ment and Economics, ABA Section on Litigation. Member, State Bars of California and
Wisconsin.
1, L. Hand, Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 LECTURES ON
LEGAL TOPICS 89, 105 (Association of the Bar of the City of New York 1926).
2. E.g., Keynote Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger to the National Conference
on the Cause of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (April 7-9,
1976) [hereinafter cited as the Pound Conference], Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for
Systematic Anticipation, reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 83, 92 (1976).
3. E.g., E. JOHNSON, JR., V. KANTOR, & E. SCHWARTZ, OUTSIDE THE COURTS: A
SURVEY OF DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIVIL CASES (1977) [hereinafter cited as
JOHNSON]; Burger, supra note 2, at 93-96; Olson, Controlling Litigation Costs: Some
Proposals For Reform, 2 LITIGATION 16 (1976); Address by Frank E.A. Sander to the
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civil suits in the federal courts seems inevitable;4 in Los Angeles, a pilot
Neighborhood Justice Center has been set up to resolve minor disputes
entirely outside the courts.5 Interestingly, however, while these and other
innovations promise more efficient dispute resolution procedures for
individual litigants, 6 very little attention has been devoted to developing
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for the large corporate litiga-
tion that consumes hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal costs and
hundreds of days in court and lawyer time.7
Arbitration stands as almost the only well-developed alternative to
full-scale litigation for entities which find themselves embroiled in dis-
Pound Conference, Varieties of Dispute Processing, reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 111, 112-18
(1976); see, e.g., Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that are Civil to Promote Justice that is
Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797, 808-19 (1971); Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits
of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 845 (1975). But see, e.g., Felstiner, Influ-
ences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 63 (1974);
Felstiner, Avoidance As Dispute Processing: An Elaboration, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 695
(1975); cf. S. 957, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 3795-97 (1977) (authorizing ap-
propriations to aid in the development of inexpensive modes of dispute resolution).
Professor Sander, for example, posits a continuum of possible dispute resolution
processes, arranged on a scale of decreasing external involvement: (1) adjudication,
including that carried out in courts, arbitrations, and administrative hearings; (2) ombuds-
men, fact-finding proceedings and inquiries; (3) mediation and conciliation; (4) negotia-
tion; and (5) avoidance. Sander, supra at 114. He suggests that each of the non-court
mechanisms should be employed as part of a "flexible and diverse panoply" of processes
to resolve a significant proportion of society's disputes. Id. at 130-32.
4. Bills mandating arbitration for certain civil cases are pending in Congress. S. 2253,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 18068-69 (1977) and H.R. 9778, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 11729 (1977) (identical bills). The proposed federal legislation
would mandate an experimental test of arbitration in five to eight federal judicial districts,
with other districts having an option to follow the same course. In the experimental
districts all cases seeking monetary damages of less than $50,000 and with no or only
"insubstantial" non-monetary claims would be referred to arbitration soon after they
were at issue. After arbitration, either party could opt for a trial de novo, but significant
costs would be taxed if the moving party did not obtain a result more favorable than the
award. For further details of the federal arbitration proposal, see notes 30-33 infra.
Several states have long had compulsory arbitration programs for certain types of
cases. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 39-55; Olson, supra note 3, at 17-19; Rosen-
berg & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims in Pennsylva-
nia, 74 HARV. L. REV. 448 (1961).
5. Bell, NJC: Concept and Reality, L.A. LAw., March 1978, at 10; Carlson, A
Local Experiment, L.A. LAW., March 1978, at 10; see D. McGILLIS & J. MULLEN,
NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL MODELS (1977).
6. E.g., Aksen, Arbitration of Automobile Accident Cases, I CONN. L. REV. 70 (1968);
Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The Need for Better
Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 357 (1972); Comment, The Medical Mal-
practice Mediation Panel in the First Judicial Department of New York: An Alternative to
Litigation, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261 (1974).
7. Obviously, there are significant differences between the problems facing corporate
and individual litigants. For example, a corporate litigant may be able to pass the costs of
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putes which cannot be solved through normal business negotiations. 8
Yet, binding arbitration is often not acceptable to the parties. Convinced
of the justness of its cause, a plaintiff may be unwilling to risk the
compromise that reputedly so often characterizes arbitration awards;
unsure of the nature and extent of its liability, a defendant may be
unwilling to give up the protection of full pretrial discovery, strict
evidentiary rules and well-defined substantive standards, especially when
the damages claimed are in six, seven or more figures.9 For these and
other reasons, many litigants and corporate attorneys approach arbitra-
tion "like a lonesome cat in a strange alley."
10
Moreover, in spite of binding arbitration's often being seen as simply
too dangerous, surprisingly little thought has been given to the possibility
that efforts at settlement might consist of something more than traditional
non-binding negotiations between lawyers or corporate executives in
which dollar bargaining is the primary focus. Indeed, the literature of
litigation settlement is made up of little other than "how-to-do-it"
manuals focusing, for example, on the resolution of personal injury
cases.II
litigation through to the consumer, while the individual litigant normally cannot.
Nevertheless, the corporate litigant's ability to pass on such costs is limited by competi-
tive factors. Moreover, to the extent that the outcome of litigation will have an effect on
business planning-such as where product development or marketing is threatened by an
unfair competition or patent infringement action-delay may be much more costly,
indirectly, to the corporate litigant than to the individual.
8. See generally M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-9
(1968); G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1977); S.
LAZARUS, J. BRAY, L. CARTER, K. COLLINS, B. GIEDT, R. HOLTON, P. MATrHEWS, & G.
WILLARD, RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES-THE POTENTIAL OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION 35-40 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LAZARUS].
9. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 43.
10. Id. at 32.
11. See, e.g., C. BADWAY & N. SHAYNE, EVALUATION AND SETTLEMENT OF PERSONAL
INJURY CASES (1976); H. BAER & A. BRODER, HOW BEST TO PREPARE AND NEGOTIATE
CASES FOR SETTLEMENT (1973); P. HERMANN, BETTER SETTLEMENTS THROUGH LEVERAGE
(1965); J. ILICH, THE ART AND SKILL OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION (1973); C. KARRASS,
THE NEGOTIATING GAME (1970); C. ROBBINS, ATTORNEY'S MASTER GUIDE TO EXPEDITING
ToP-DOLLAR CASE SETTLEMENTS (1975); H. ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT (1970); R.
SIMMONS, WINNING BEFORE TRIAL: How TO PREPARE CASES FOR THE BEST SETTLEMENT
OR TRIAL RESULT (1974). See generally H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, PROBLEMS, READINGS
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR (1977).
One notable exception is R. COULSON, HOW TO STAY OUT OF COURT (1968) [hereinafter
cited as COULSON]. Mr. Coulson sees traditional arbitration as only one of numerous
possible alternatives to litigation: "Litigants are not anchored to the court system. They
have a right to invent their own procedures, to dismiss the safeguards provided by the
courts and to expedite their litigation . . . . [They have an] interest in learning how to
improvise new techniques for bringing a controversy to a conclusion." Id. at 155.
One innovative suggestion for dealing with problems of congestion, cost and delay has
been to establish a private profit-making court system paralleling existing federal and state
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Yet merely because the legal difficulties of lower and middle income
Americans may constitute more important social problems on most
people's scale of values, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that
the crisis in American civil justice extends beyond those groups into large
case litigation. The problems of large case litigation are ones which
affect the quality of civil justice as a whole. The pretrial paper wars and
extended trials of many such cases play a significant role in clogging the
dockets of our courts, both state and federal. Further, the extraordinary
costs of litigating such cases affect not merely the corporations them-
selves, but, of necessity, their employees and shareholders, and the
consumer.
There are several possible reasons why there has been a dearth of
innovative ideas aimed at devising alternate dispute resolution mecha-
nisms for large case litigation. Perhaps the corporate litigation bar should
be blamed for a lack of imagination, for an unwillingness to take risks,
and for a failure to apply careful cost-benefit analysis to their activities on
behalf of their clients. Perhaps corporate managements should be blamed
for too often allowing themselves to be insulated from the litigation
process, either because they seek to avoid ultimate responsibility or
because they mistakenly believe that the complexities of the process are
for lawyers only. Perhaps the true culprit is the relative insularity of most
American legal education:
Another barrier to the active participation of lawyers in the crea-
tion of new "justice-producing" institutions lies in the structure and
content of legal education. Law schools rarely teach the essential
skills of negotiation and mediation; rather, their concentration on the
dissection of appellate court cases emphasizes the escalation of
disputes rather than their prevention or early settlement. . . . The
dearth of interdisciplinary study makes it difficult for lawyers to
perceive alternative ways of dealing with different types of existing
disputes and those likely to arise from emerging technologies.12
courts. Person, Justice, Inc.-A Proposal for a Profit-Making Court, JURIs DocToR,
March 1978, at 32, 39. Although the private judges of the National Private Court would
function legally as arbitrators, the court would differ from arbitration in that it would
follow federal procedure. Thus, litigants would be "able to maintain claims and defenses
without running the risk of the unwanted compromises that are expected in binding
arbitration." Id. at 38.
12. Nader & Singer, Dispute Resolution, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 281, 314-15 (Supp. 1976).
One senior executive recently "branded lawyers as 'Roman Gladiators,' more inter-
ested in scoring against opposing counsel than in achieving a quick settlement." Ryan,
Costly Counsel, Wall St. J., April 13, 1978, at 1, col.l and 32, col.4. The President of the
United States now echoes such sentiments. "By resorting to litigation at the drop of a hat,
by regarding the adversary system as an end in itself," President Carter recently said, "we
have made justice more cumbersome, more expensive, and less equal than it ought to be."
Address by President Jimmy Carter to The Los Angeles County Bar Association, May 4,
1978, reprinted in L.A. LAW., June 1978, at 15, 43.
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Whatever the reason, the failure of the corporate litigation bar to
develop alternate dispute resolution mechanisms is particularly puzzling
given another usual characteristic of their corporate clients. Most
companies have a firm policy of attempting to avoid litigation by inves-
tigating and resolving disputes on a businesslike basis as promptly as
possible. They generally "prefer the procedural uncertainties of private
settlement techniques to the substantive uncertainties of the courts."1 3 It
is common, for example, for corporate management faced with a ripen-
ing conflict with another company to schedule a meeting at which
responsible employees from each company appear and present both sides
of the dispute. In such circumstances the business principals of the com-
panies sit as fact-finders and as judges. They may or may not consult
counsel.
By contrast, once litigation is initiated such simple and informal
attempts at dispute resolution rarely occur. Settlement discussions in-
volving corporate management thereafter generally subordinate debate
on substantive issues to a more direct consideration of what it will taketo
settle the case.
This article rests on the proposition that both the crisis in American
civil justice and the interests of corporate clients demand that attorneys
involved in large case litigation consider alternate mechanisms aimed at
expediting fair settlement of the disputes at issue. After examining in
more detail the problems which demand efforts at such solutions, the
article describes one novel dispute resolution mechanism created to
resolve a typical, complex and costly piece of federal litigation, one
which proved successful in the eyes of all concerned. Finally, the article
considers more generally the advantages of making an effort to settle a
large case by doing more than tossing out an occasional settlement
figure.
II. DEMON LITIGATION
Corporate executives and in-house counsel know that it can be disas-
trous for a company simply to be sued, let alone suffer an adverse
judgment. There is no escaping one infallible premise-resolving the
dispute will be very costly. Payment will be either to the plaintiff, to
defense counsel, or-worst of all-to both. House counsel and manage-
ment also know that successfully defending a large lawsuit is frequently
more costly than simply paying a large settlement to the plaintiff: Indeed,
defendants are often convinced that this is the only basis for the suit in the
first place. 4
13. COULSON, supra note 11, at 22.
14. Cf. id. at 23-24:
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The cost of large corporate litigation also has a great impact on
plaintiffs. Since the defendant is typically in possession of the money or
property that is the subject matter of the dispute and has the use of it
during the pendency of the suit, the defendant will often have both reason
and the resources to drag out the litigation. A corporation with an
unassailable claim and sufficient resources to prosecute fully a court case
may find that discovery hurdles placed by the defendant between the
summons at the starting line and the judgment at the finish have made the
prize not worth the pursuit.
The cost of prosecuting or defending a large corporate lawsuit involv-
ing unresolved legal contentions, complex factual issues, many witnes-
ses, and the usual roomfuls of documents may be divided into two basic
categories-(1) pretrial discovery and motion costs and (2) trial costs.
Discovery and motion costs usually accrue at a slower rate than trial
costs, but build up over a longer period of time-often for two, three, or
as many as five years.
Reliable figures are hard to come by,' 5 especially for pretrial costs of
litigation, but one authority estimated in 1975 that the cost to the client of
counsel's merely reading and taking notes on the documents produced in
a moderately-sized civil litigation--defined as a case involving 10,000
documents of an average of ten pages per document and generating 5000
pages of transcript-is $300,000.16 This figure did not include the more
time-consuming process of searching the documents for combinations of
facts and analyzing the assembled data. Allowing for inflation, which
affects the legal profession as much as it does industry, these figuies
would be even higher today.
Indeed, there is a growing feeling among business-oriented attorneys
and critical commentators that modern discovery practice, introduced as
a great reform, is now more of a problem than a solution. One critic
states:
Coupled with requests for class action treatment, discovery has been
perverted into a vehicle for extracting substantial settlements, with
One Wall Street trial lawyer representing a huge chemical company in a controversy
with a supplier of crude oil told me how he expected to settle the case: "We intend to
enforce our right to examine every document that has any relevance to this transac-
tion. Over 100,000 separate pieces of paper are involved, and we will require every
one of them. When our opponents realize how disruptive this case is going to be, they
will make an attractive settlement offer. Their company can't afford the expense."
15. See Green, The Gross Legal Product: How Much Justice Can You Afford?, in
VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 63, 72-75 (1976); Cole, SCM v. XEROX: Paper Blizzard for 1.8
Billion, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1977, at 1, col.1 and 32, cols. 4 and 5 (city ed.); Sander,
supra note 3, at 125-26.
16. Halverson, Coping with the Fruits of Discovery in the Complex Case-The Systems
Approach To Litigation Support, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 39-40 n.2 (1975).
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some defendants reluctantly consenting to this extortion in order to
avoid years of involvement, enormous expenses and attorneys' fees,
and the inordinate drain upon corporate time and energy that is
inevitably involved in the defense. 17
But discovery and other pretrial costs are not the only factors that make
suing or being sued, even unjustly, a major economic event for a
corporation today. Should the parties not reach a settlement after ex-
hausting themselves in the discovery and pretrial motion phase of the
litigation, costs escalate significantly in the immediate pretrial prepara-
tion phase, as counsel "staff-up" with experts, associates and paraleg-
als. Costs increase again for the trial itself. In one extreme but not unique
case, the SCM antitrust suit against Xerox,18 the legal costs during trial to
SCM and Xerox combined have been conservatively estimated to be
$50,000 a day, five days a week, or over $1,000,000 a month. Trial is
expected to last five to eight months. The pretrial costs were likely even
higher. The two sides took pretrial depositions from a total of 233
potential witnesses. Of course, the stakes are high-SCM seeks $1.8
billion in damages. 19
Moreover, the tangible costs that show up directly on the income
statement under "legal costs" are only a part of the actual costs of large
corporate litigation. Management time and energy and technical re-
sources diverted from normal activites to the litigation process are addi-
tional overhead items, with no productive possibilities, that increase the
cost of goods produced or services rendered. Thus, prospect of an
indirect as well as a direct drain on the corporate resources during two to
five years of litigation is often a strong incentive for top management to
seek some means of informally resolving litigation and getting employ-
ees back to productive work, even if it means paying money management
feels is not owed.2"
There is a third party whose interests also must be recognized-the
judicial system. Although comprising only a small percentage of cases,
17. Byrnes, Discovery: Its Uses and Abuses-The Defendants' Perspective, 44 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 14, 25 (1975). Further, says Mr. Byrnes:
The dilemma of defense counsel in attempting to deal with these abuses is aggravated
by two significant trends in the judicial handling of discovery problems. The first is
the growing reluctance of federal judges to involve themselves in discovery matters
and the second is the almost wholesale unwillingness of the courts to employ the
sanctions provided for in [F.R. Civ. P.] Rule 37.
Id.
18. For an earlier aspect of this case, see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 507 F.2d 358 (2d
Cir. 1974). An even more striking example is described in Wolfram, The Antibiotics Class
Actions, 1976 A.B.F. RES. J. 253 (litigation extended over more than two decades).
19. Cole, supra note 15, at 41, col. 6.
20. See, e.g., COULSON, supra note 11, at 20-21; Kaufman, Judicial Reform in the Next
Century, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1976).
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large corporate litigation increasingly consumes a disproportionately
large amount of judicial and lawyer resources, contributing to an already
severe congestion problem.2 This problem is assuming crisis proportions
in some places as delays run into four or five years and court systems
approach the breakdown point.22
In the federal system, the district court civil case load continues to
show an upward trend, as it has for the last fifteen years. In 1976,
130,597 civil cases were filed in the district courts, compared to 117,320
in 1975 and 59,284 in 1960. This is an increase of 11.3% over 1975 and
120.3% over 1960.23 An even more disturbing statistic is that of the
136,753 cases pending in the district courts at the close of 1976 (exclu-
sive of land condemnation cases), 9,414 had been pending for more than
three years. Moreover, the trend is to greater delay. The percentage of
cases pending for more than one, two, and three years in 1976 increased
over 1975 by 25.5%, 23.5% and 24.5%, respectively.
2 4
The statistics for the federal courts of appeals are similarly alarming.
The number of new cases docketed in 1976 showed a 10.5% increase
over 1975, and a 281.7% increase over 1962. Altogether, 18,408 cases
were filed for appeal in 1976, compared to 4,823 in 1962.25
21. See Address by Francis R. Kirkham to the Pound Conference, Complex Civil
Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976).
22. The SCM case, for example, was filed on July 31, 1973. SCM Corp. v. Xerox
Corp., 507 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir. 1974). Trial began in June, 1977. Cole, supra note 15, at
41, col. 6.
23. [1976] ANN. REP. OF THE DIR. OF THE AD. OFF. OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
reprinted in REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 75, 169, table 15 (1976).
Although the district courts have also managed to increase their terminations during this
period, they have not been able to keep pace with filings. For example, in 1976 termina-
tions increased only 5. 1% over the previous year, falling short of the number of filings by
20,422 cases. As a result, the pending case load at the end of 1976 was 17.1% higher than
the pending case load at the end of 1975 and 128.9% higher thin the pending case load in
1960. Id.
Of course, the figures vary among the districts. In 1976, the District Court for the
Southern District of California led all districts by a significant margin with a 143.6%
increase in filings over 1975 and a concomitant 113.9% increase in pending cases. The
District Court for the Central District of California showed a more moderate 13.1%
increase in pending cases from 1975 to 1976, but even this lower figure is disturbing
because the pending cases increased while the number of new filings decreased 2.6%. Id.
at 177, table 18.
24. Id. at 183, table 21.
25. Id. at 153, table 1.
While there was a small increase over 1975 in the number of cases terminated by the
courts of appeals, in 1976 cases pending rose by 16.3% over 1975 to a total of 14,110 cases
pending on courts of appeals dockets at the end of the year. This is a 494.11% increase over
the number of cases pending in 1961. Id. at 152, 155, table 2. Breaking the problem down
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Given such statistics, it is obvious that either radical reform of the
dispute resolution process or a commitment of vastly more resources to
the judicial system, or both, are necessary just to keep matters from
getting worse than they already are. 26 But private lawyers representing
corporate clients increasingly disgruntled with large legal fees cannot
wait for long term reform. The corporate litigator must explore every
available dispute resolution mechanism that might be advantageous to the
client.
Ill. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH
One such experimental dispute resolution mechanism was successfully
developed and implemented last year in a major patent infringement suit
between two large corporations in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California. 27 The procedure consisted, in essence, of a
non-binding "mini-trial" before top corporate management and a pri-
vately hired, neutral advisor who had served as a United States Court of
Claims trial judge. The entire procedure, which took several months to
organize but only two days of presentation time, was conducted outside
the judicial system and contained no coercive characteristics. Yet, within
one-half hour of the close of the procedure, the parties reached a settle-
ment in principle of what had been a long and bitterly fought lawsuit.
To describe the case briefly, plaintiff held several patents relating to
computerized charge-authorization and credit-verification devices. These
patents had been licensed to several major manufacturers, but had never
been thoroughly tested in litigation. Defendant was a manufacturer of
computerized charge and credit authorization devices. Plaintiff contend-
ed that defendant's devices utilized plaintiff's patented technology. De-
fendant in turn denied that it used technology covered by any valid claim
of plaintiff's patents, and further alleged that plaintiff's patents were
invalid and unenforceable under several traditional patent doctrines.
Plaintiff claimed it was entitled to substantial damages for past infringe-
ment and to an injunction restraining future infringement. Such injunc-
tive relief would have destroyed a major product line of defendant.
into its most basic components, the number of pending cases per court of appeals
judgeship in 1976 averaged 145, an increase of 137.7% over 1966 and 383.3% over 1961.
Id. at 156, table 3.
26. Professor John H. Barton has projected that if appellate case loads continue to
grow to the year 2010 at the rate they have grown in the last decade, we will need 5,000
federal appellate judges to handle the one million federal appellate cases each year, with
their decisions reported in more than 1,000 volumes of the Federal Reporter. Barton,
Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 (1975).
27. The authors, along with in-house counsel and a patent attorney, represented one of
the parties.
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Both sides asserted that their respective positions were supported by
the opinions of independent experts. As the litigation progressed, these
positions hardened. Accusations of bad faith in complying with dis-
covery requests exacerbated feelings which had grown out of a long
history of competition between technical and business personnel of the
two companies and out of plaintiff's prelitigation efforts to sell defendant
a license.
Meanwhile, discovery proceeded apace, sometimes at a furious rate.
In an effort to find out precisely how defendant's devices worked and to
prove its infringement case, plaintiff pursued an extensive program of
document production and inspection, took depositions of many of de-
fendant's employees, and submitted multiple sets of interrogatories and
requests for admissions. Defendant commenced extensive discovery in
an attempt to force plaintiff to be more precise in its allegations and to
obtain evidence for invalidity counterclaims.
This activity did achieve some beneficial results, narrowing con-
siderably the areas in dispute between the parties. But the cost of this
discovery, and of the motion practice that accompanied it, was very high.
Moreover, while the case had thus been somewhat simplified, defend-
ant's exposure had not been materially lessened, and the parties' posi-
tions on the issues remaining in dispute were 180 degrees apart. Defend-
ant remained convinced that it had not infringed a valid claim of the
patents. Plaintiff remained convinced that defendant had knowingly and
wilfully infringed its valuable patents. Whenever an attempt was made to
discuss a compromise settlement in traditional ways, the discussion
foundered on the sharp conflict over the merits of the case. Further, the
defendant felt that the amount demanded by plaintiff for a license was
unrealistic and indefensible, even assuming some infringement. Plaintiff,
however, felt its proposals were eminently reasonable. Further, it had
made a considerable investment in the case. Thus, no lower figure was
forthcoming.
Some two and one-half years after the complaint had been filed, there
was still no trial or pretrial date on the horizon.28 By then, legal fees for
both sides had reached several hundred thousand dollars, and promised to
mount at an increasing rate as trial neared. In addition to immediate
pretrial preparation, both parties faced the prospect of significant addi-
tional discovery, including extensive depositions of the inventors and
28. The slow pace of this case was attributable in part to the judge's illness for several
months during this period. Most judges in the Central District try to move their cases
faster than this case moved. Nonetheless, delays of this magnitude are not uncommon in
large, complex cases.
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other technical personnel. Aspects of both parties' ongoing businesses
were clouded by uncertainty over the outcome of the suit. Thus, after
years of hard litigation, both sides were open to some procedure that
could resolve the dispute one way or the other.
Initially, plaintiff proposed binding arbitration. But doubts about the
enforceability of arbitration decrees in patent cases, 29 defendant's corpo-
rate policy against submitting to arbitration in such situations, and its
concern that an arbitration compromise might require it to pay a substan-
tial sum to plaintiff foreclosed that option.
The procedure eventually hammered out consisted of a six-week
schedule providing for expedited, limited discovery and the exchange of
position papers and exhibits, and culminating in a two-day "Information
Exchange." At the Information Exchange each side was to have the
opportunity and responsibility to present orally to top management repre-
sentatives of both companies its "best case" on the issues of infringe-
ment, validity, and enforceability. Management was then to assess the
theories, strengths and weaknesses of the respective positions and meet
together, without counsel, to attempt to resolve the dispute from the new
perspective obtained at the Information Exchange.
It was also agreed to have a mutually selected "neutral advisor" attend
the Information Exchange. The advisor was to moderate the proceedings;
he was not, however, to try to effect a compromise of the dispute.
Rather, in the event management did not resolve the dispute in their
initial post-Information Exchange discussions, the advisor was to submit
a written non-binding opinion discussing the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of the parties' positions and predicting the likely outcome of trial.
Thereafter, management would meet again and try to resolve the dispute
with the added spur of the advisor's opinion. It was felt likely that the
party against whom the advisor opined would thereafter be willing to
make significant concessions. In addition, it was thought that the pros-
pect of the opinion would cause the parties to be more realistic in their
evaluations and demands as they discussed settlement immediately after
the Information Exchange.
Other aspects of the procedure included:
* Postponement of all pending discovery in the case, except that
absolutely necessary to prepare for the Information Exchange, with no
waiver of the right to take further discovery should the case not be
settled. Partial depositions, for example, could be taken without prejud-
29. See, e.g., N.V. Maatshappij Voor Indutriele Waarden v. Smith, 532 F.2d 874 (2d
Cir. 1976).
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icing the right to take a full deposition of the same person at a later
time.30
* Provision that, by mutual agreement, any discovery disputes that
arose during the six weeks of expedited limited discovery could be
submitted to the advisor for his "advice."
* Initial sharing of the fees and expenses of the advisor, but assess-
ment of these fees and costs to the eventual losing party, in the event that
a settlement could not be reached and a trial was conducted.
31
* Stipulation to basic source material to be submitted to the advisor
in advance of the Information Exchange.
* Exchange in advance and submission to the advisor of all exhibits
to be used at the Information Exchange, as well as short briefs in the form
of "introductory statements."
* Opportunity for the advisor to submit written questions to the
parties' technical experts prior to the Information Exchange.
* Suspension of the rules of evidence during the Information Ex-
change.32
* Unlimited scope as to the nature of the material offered during each
party's presentation period at the Information Exchange. The advisor was
authorized to ask clarifying questions, but was explicitly told he was
neither to preside like a judge or arbitrator nor to limit the parties'
presentations.
* Total insulation of the Information Exchange procedure, and its
results, from the court. Reference to the court concerning any aspect of
the Information Exchange was forbidden. The written submissions pre-
pared specifically for the Information Exchange and oral statements
made during the Information Exchange by the parties were to be
inadmissible at trial for any purpose, including impeachment.33 How-
ever, evidence that was otherwise admissible was not to be rendered
inadmissible as a result of its use at the Information Exchange.
30. Cf. S. 2253, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CoNG. REC. 18068-69 (1977). The proposed
federal arbitration act would significantly limit discovery. Referral of a case to arbitration
could not be delayed more than 120 days after the filing of an answer and arbitration
would have to begin 30 days thereafter.
31. Cf. id., providing that if the party demanding a trial de novo after arbitration fails to
obtain a judgment more favorable than the arbitration award, it shall be assessed the cost
of the arbitration proceeding, plus interest on the arbitration award.
32. Cf. id., providing that the Federal Rules of Evidence may be used as a "guide" to
the admissibility of evidence in an arbitration hearing, but that notwithstanding the rules,
relevant nonprivileged evidence "may" be admitted.
33. Cf. id., the proposed federal arbitration act would allow testimony given at an
arbitration to be used for impeachment at a subsequent trial de novo. However, the act
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* Disqualification of the advisor as a trial witness, consultant, or
expert for either party. Additionally, the use of his advisory opinion for
any purpose in any dispute between the parties was prohibited.
It was agreed that any violation of the last two rules by either party
would seriously prejudice the opposing party, be prima facie grounds for
a mistrial or disqualification motion, and would entitle the opposing party
to full compensation for its share of the advisor's fees and expenses,
irrespective of the outcome of any trial.34
Even though the procedure contemplated that the presentations were to
be directed to management, which would have complete responsibility
for any resolution of the dispute, mutual agreement on selection of the
advisor was obviously crucial to the procedure's success. It was feared
that this would be a major stumbling block. Somewhat surprisingly,
however, selection of the advisor was quickly and easily accomplished.
Each side proposed two persons as its "nominees." Plaintiff proposed a
retired court of claims trial judge with considerable patentlaw expertise
and a distinguished law professor in this field. Defendant proposed two
former federal judges. All four nominees were contacted and all four
agreed to serve as the advisor if selected. In each case, the nominees'
expressed willingness to serve was based in part on a desire to participate
in a novel and experimental procedure. Primarily because of his exten-
sive judicial experience in the patent area, the former court of claims trial
judge was selected. The choice proved a wise one, as the concentrated
nature of the proceeding required someone intimately familiar with both
modem technology and a rather technical area of the law.
Plaintiff opened the Information Exchange with four uninterrupted
afternoon hours devoted to a presentation of its prima facie infringement
case. The next morning, defendant had one and one-half hours to present
a reply, which was followed by a one-half hour rebuttal by plaintiff and
an hour of an open question and answer exchange on infringement. On
the afternoon of the second day, the parties reversed roles. Defendant had
also specifies that at the trial de novo, the court shall not admit evidence that there had
been an arbitration proceeding. These two apparently conflicting provisions may prove
difficult to implement in practice. Moreover, allowing the use at trial of testimony given at
an arbitration proceeding even for impeachment may be a disincentive for a party to
choose arbitration voluntarily.
34. All the above aspects of the Information Exchange were embodied in an Informa-
tion Exchange Agreement, which was signed by management and counsel for both parties.
Although the parties did not explicitly rely upon anything other than the contractual nature
of the Agreement to make it binding, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do seem to
provide for such agreements. FED. R. Civ. P. 29, relating to stipulations regarding
discovery procedure, provides that "the parties may by written stipulation. .. modify
the procedures provided by these rules for other methods of discovery . .. ."
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four hours to present its invalidity and unenforceability arguments, fol-
lowed the next morning by plaintiff's reply, defendant's rebuttal, and an
open question and answer session.
The actual presentations were made primarily by attorneys, with sig-
nificant participation by the parties' experts, each a noted computer
authority. Plaintiff also presented a former employee of one of its
licensees, while defendant used one of its scientists to present a technical
aspect of its case.
During the presentations each side gained significant new insights into
the opposing party's claims. For example, plaintiff presented a new
argument during its initial four-hour presentation which it felt anticipated
and answered one of defendant's most important invalidity theories.
Although defendant had been aware that plaintiff might eventually take
such a position, plaintiff's discovery responses, up to the point of the
Information Exchange, seemed to defendant to indicate otherwise. Plain-
tiff's presentation on this issue required defendant's attorneys to re-
evaluate a key element of their defense and to restructure significantly
their planned presentation for the next day. After an all-night blitz,
defense counsel presented a response to plaintiff's new argument that, for
the first time in the litigation, sharply pinpointed the parties' precise legal
and factual differences on a vital element of the case. Additional discus-
sion and questions from management and the advisor exposed difficulties
for plaintiff that prior thereto it had not clearly discerned. Similarly,
plaintiff made several other points during its initial presentation and
during its rebuttal to defendant's presentation that enabled defendant to
appreciate more fully plaintiff's position.
The Information Exchange's question and answer sessions were par-
ticularly useful in defining and narrowing each side's contentions. Where
difficulties arose, the advisor facilitated the discussion with his ques-
tions. Occasionally, the advisor's comments indicated where he felt
serious problems existed for each side. This participation was particular-
ly helpful in bringing home to the participants the strengths and weak-
nesses of their cases.
Immediately after the Information Exchange ended, top management
for each side met privately without lawyers. Within one-half hour, they
reached an agreement in principle, which became the basis for resolving
the dispute. Although the details took several weeks to tie up, the drain
on both corporations' treasuries was plugged and a case which had
threatened to occupy the time and energy of a federal court for months
was terminated without an additional day of court time. This was success
by any standard.
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IV. SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
For the parties involved, the success of the Information Exchange was
testimony enough to its value. For others who may be interested in
similar experimentation, however, several additional aspects of the pro-
cedure might be pointed out. Every case is different, and what worked in
the case discussed might not work at all in another situation. In con-
sidering whether to try a procedure like the one described or to create a
new model, counsel and clients must consider many variables and make a
cost-benefit analysis to determine the best way to proceed. In this
analysis the following factors may be relevant.
First, very little of the money expended on the Information Exchange
would have been wasted had the proceeding not resulted in a resolution
of the dispute. The Information Exchange forced each side rigorously to
organize the mass of facts and legal arguments which had been gathered
over two and one-half years of discovery and legal maneuvering, just as
they would have had to do to prepare the case for pretrial and trial."5 The
"introductory statements" were short versions of what would have been
trial briefs, the "oral presentations" were outlines of what would have
been trial evidence, and the exhibits were the same as those that would
have had to be collected and organized for trial. Thus, the procedure as
implemented demanded preparation by counsel and experts which would
have been directly useful at trial had the case not been settled.
The only Information Exchange expenditures which were not related
to activities which would have had to have been incurred in any case for
trial were those relating to the negotiations which led to the Information
Exchange and those for the time spent at the Information Exchange itself.
For one of the parties, these amounted to approximately 25% of total
Information Exchange expenditures. These non-transferable expendi-
tures were the only monies risked by that party's management in carrying
out the Information Exchange. Total costs to judgment would have been
approximately ten times greater. Because management considered that it
was thus risking a relatively small amount of money in order to avoid an
35. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 16, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California has developed and instituted an elaborate mandatory pretrial proce-
dure. C.D. CAL. R. 9. As the rule is implemented by some judges, preparing for and
presenting a case at pretrial involves much the same effort as preparing and presenting the
Information Exchange. The purpose of such highly developed pretrial procedures is the
same as that of the Information Exchange-simplification of issues, avoidance of un-
necessary proof and, if possible, disposition of the case without trial. The advantage of an
Information Exchange procedure is that it takes place outside of the judicial system. The
parties retain complete control over timing, scope, manner of presentation, participants,
follow-up procedures, and so forth. The disadvantage is that it is purely voluntary.
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otherwise certain expenditure of a great deal more, it viewed the required
financial investment as well worth the risk that the procedure might be a
flop.
Moreover, since the pending Information Exchange forced counsel to
concentrate their efforts within several weeks, rather than over many
months or years, there was no need for them to spend preliminary time to
reeducate themselves on the case as crises or significant events occurred.
The matter as a whole had to be mastered and kept in mind during the
entire period. Because of this necessity for organizing the case in a short
time, connections between relevant facts, and between facts and legal
theories, which might not otherwise have been made until pretrial or trial
were made significantly earlier. Had the litigation continued, this would
have fostered more focused discovery and pretrial preparation. In sum,
had the case not been settled, the intensive time spent by counsel in
preparing for the Information Exchange would likely have been worth
significantly more to the client than the same amount of less focused time
spent during the long pretrial phase of the case.
Apart from the prospects of earlier settlement and of the client's
obtaining a better return per dollar in attorney's fees spent, there are other
potential advantages for client and attorney alike from an Information
Exchange procedure. Significantly, it may provide a means for a client to
discipline its attorneys. For example, sometimes where there is little or
no pressure coming from the court, defense attorneys approach a case-
even an important one-in a relatively relaxed manner. Thus, they may
not immediately investigate or organize the factual and legal aspects of
the case in a sufficiently thorough manner to appreciate fully the true
legal situation and proper settlement posture. In other circumstances, the
lack of pressure sometimes leads attorneys into over-litigation, unneces-
sarily dotting "i's" and crossing "t's" with regard to both discovery and
legal research. An attorney's judgment about what is essential may be
controlled by the amount of time and associate resources available. In
either case, the Information Exchange procedure can serve as a useful
management tool, forcing careful and early analysis on the one hand and
selective judgment on the other.
From the attorney's perspective, the Information Exchange procedure
may have the equally important effect of involving and educating the
client. In the end, decisions with regard to settlement and legal expenses
must be made by the client's responsible executive. Often, however,
attorneys feel that these executives do not devote enough attention to
litigation and therefore are unable to make well-informed judgments.
Even where corporate in-house counsel is actively involved in a case, it is
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important for the outside litigator primarily responsible for the case to be
able to deal with a decision-making executive who actually understands
the detailed allegations and facts of the case in more than a second-hand
manner.
The Information Exchange provides an opportunity for educating an
executive to make rational decisions about the litigation. This can pay off
in more ways than just settling the case. Even if the Information Ex-
change does not lead to settlement, it will leave the business principals
with a much more accurate understanding of the nature of the dispute and
with a greater appreciation of counsel's later attempts to mobilize corpo-
rate employees to assist in pursuing or responding to resumed discovery
and in preparing for trial. Moreover, the procedure provides the execu-
tive with an opportunity to actually see, hear and take the measure of the
antagonists in a situation akin to that which will obtain at trial. Thus, for
client and attorney alike, the Information Exchange which does not lead
to settlement will by its very nature still serve to reduce uncertainty with
regard to the other side's position. Especially where an Information
Exchange provides an opportunity for free questioning of the other side
with regard to its legal and factual arguments, there is a higher likelihood
that one will ferret out the other side's "best case" than with traditional
discovery techniques.
The Information Exchange described above came at a relatively late
stage in the proceedings, after considerable pretrial sparring and dis-
covery. Communication had broken down and compromise through
traditional settlement negotiations did not appear possible. Nevertheless,
it seemed reasonable to believe that each party was still capable of acting
with a minimum of rationality-desiring to resolve the case as favorably
as possible, with the least expense and risk, and the least delay. What
was crucial to the ultimate resolution was that litigators on both sides,
conscious that there remained some remote possibility of creating an
avenue of communication, did not simply throw up their hands and begin
to gird for trial. Just as important, executives on both sides were willing
to risk an untried procedure.
Thus, counsel devised a procedure which combined in a new way
features of various well-known dispute resolution mechanisms. For ex-
ample, the Information Exchange assured a particular form of participa-
tion for the parties-the opportunity to present proofs and arguments-
which is basic to one scholar's definition of the adjudicatory process. 6
However, unlike adjudication and arbitration, the Information Exchange
36. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 WISCONSIN L. REV. 1, 19; see
Sander, supra note 3, at 115.
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did not establish a win/lose situation. In this respect, it resembled
mediation, conciliation or negotiation. The parties did set their own rules
of procedure and select a third party to help resolve the dispute. In these
respects the Information Exchange procedure followed an arbitration
model; however, unlike an arbitrator, the advisor had no binding deci-
sion-making capacity. Yet his very presence-and the ultimate prospect
of his advisory opinion-provided a strong incentive to the parties to be
both credible and careful in their presentations. In essence, the advisor
was akin to a mediator or conciliator, except that his charge was merely to
help determine the probable victor at trial rather than also to facilitate
compromise.
Had the case been at a different stage or had there been different
crucial issues, the structure of the Information Exchange would surely
have been different. For example, if the Information Exchange had come
earlier in the litigation, before the bulk of discovery, a longer period of
expedited, limited pre-Information Exchange discovery might have been
necessary. Nevertheless, since reducing discovery costs is a primary
incentive for trying such a procedure, it seems advisable to attempt such
an approach as early in the case as possible, and to keep even the
expedited discovery as limited as possible. Realistically, however, the
need for a formalized settlement procedure will rarely be appreciated
until after traditional, informal negotiations have failed and discovery
and other pretrial proceedings have brought home the realities of the
process and sated the initial thirst for litigative combat.
Further, the rather complex procedure described above seems better
suited to cases involving mixed questions of law and fact-questions
dealing with the legal consequences of a variety of factual circum-
stances-than with questions solely, or primarily, of law or credibility.
Thus, for example, the procedure seems well suited to resolving an
antitrust case where the "sticking point" to settlement is the scope and
definition of the relevant market, or an unfair competition case where the
crucial issue is the propriety of certain disputed business practices. By
contrast, where a case turns solely on legal issues, summary judg-
ment procedures are likely to provide a means to resolve it. But where a
case primarily turns on factual disputes involving credibility, the kind of
Information Exchange procedure described above is not likely to be any
more effective in resolving the case than traditional settlement negotia-
tions or arbitration. However, where the factual disputes are technical
ones, requiring expert analysis and promising a "battle of the experts" at
trial, d modified Information Exchange procedure involving a neutral
expert might be the best approach. Thus, in a circumstance where, for
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example, the performance of a product is at issue, a joint testing proce-
dure carried out by each side's experts and a neutral expert might well
provide sufficient data to foster a settlement through traditional negotia-
tions, without the necessity of also having a full-blown Information
Exchange.
V. CONCLUSION
Obviously the concept presented here is not a panacea. By itself it is no
cure for the court congestion and delay that plague our formal dispute
resolution system, or for the ruinous litigation costs that increasingly
concern corporate executives. Even so, the success of this procedure
should demonstrate to the corporate litigation bar that successful alterna-
tives to a million dollar litigation can be devised.
If such alternatives are to be developed and implemented, the corpo-
rate litigator must be familiar with the features of different dispute
resolution mechanisms so that when faced with a situation in which an
Information Exchange or some other dispute resolution proceeding seems
appropriate, different characteristics can be borrowed from those tradi-
tional mechanisms. The end result, like a Dr. Seuss creation, may not be
immediately recognizable as anything remotely familiar. But the only
appropriate criterion is whether it will work.
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